Jonathon D. Jones

April 30, 2002

The Consequences of Rejecting Doxastic Voluntarism

Lack of doxastic voluntarism is often cited in objections to internalism. People that reject doxastic voluntarism believe that, in many cases (but not necessarily all cases) our beliefs are out of our control. This paper is an investigation into the consequences of rejecting doxastic voluntarism.

First, what does this mean for externalists? Many externalists are reliabilists; they believe that a belief is justified “only if there is a reliable connection between the belief and truth” (Crumley 66). Viewing a cow under normal circumstances is rather reliable, and thus I would be justified in believing that there is really a cow in the field. Viewing a cow while under the influence of a drug, like LSD, is less reliable, and I would probably not be justified in believing that there is a cow in the field.

Most reliabilists would want to say, I think, that I should believe that the cow is in the field in the first example, and that I shouldn’t believe it in the second. Assuming we can recognize instances of reliable methods of obtaining beliefs and unreliable ones, beliefs in the first category seem to be better than beliefs in the latter. But if doxastic voluntarism is rejected, I have no choice in the matter; either way, I automatically will believe that there is really a cow in the field. Thus, whether or not the belief is justified, I have no choice but to accept it.

This, I think, starts to show the problems with rejection of doxastic voluntarism. According to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “epistemologists are concerned with what it takes for a belief to be justified, rational, reasonable, or warranted” (430). But if doxastic voluntarism is false, none of these terms really matter aside from pure description. Whether a belief is justified or rational will have no real bearing on whether it is accepted by anyone, since they do not have any control over the acceptance of beliefs.

More troubling still is what this might do to the idea of “experts” in a field. At best, an expert can now only really be described as someone who happens to have a number of true beliefs in an area. How she came to those true beliefs is of no consequence, since she had no choice but to believe them. A math professor, for instance, can either believe that 2*2 = 4, or that 2*2 = 5, but he has no choice; some process beyond his control determines which of the two he believes. The fact that the first is more logical and reasonable to believe is, at best, merely reflected in that process.

Another problem is what this does for morality. According to the Philosophical Dictionary, a “person is responsible for his acts only when he has sufficient moral knowledge…” (352). If doxastic voluntarism is rejected, whether or not one has moral knowledge is out of one’s control. That is, it would seem to be the case that I would have no moral duty to try to accumulate this “moral knowledge”, since whether or not I have it is out of my control. But this seems very non-intuitive; most moral theorists, I would think, would believe that it is morally good to obtain moral knowledge.

Morality has a more serious issue with the rejection of doxastic voluntarism, however, and that is this: one’s actions are largely determined by one’s beliefs. This, I think, is rather obvious. I walk northwest to get to school because I believe that my school is northwest of my apartment. I eat an apple because I believe that it will help sustain me and that it will taste good. Many other beliefs are factored into both of these actions, and I think the combination of all of these beliefs result in the action that occurs. Even if this is not accepted, I think it is at least uncontroversial that beliefs form a large part of the decision making process.

But if doxastic voluntarism were false, that would seem to mean that a large part of the decision-making is out of one’s control. If beliefs completely determine what action is taken, then all of the decision-making is now out of one’s control. This means that the actor is no longer responsible for his action, or at least largely irresponsible for his action. Responsibility is a necessary condition for moral judgments (at least for most moral theorists), and so the rejection of doxastic voluntarism severely limits the moral judgments that can be made.

Free will, for most people, is valuable on its own. The above paragraphs already have shown problems with rejecting doxastic voluntarism and accepting free will, so I will not elucidate much further into it. However, I did want to point to it as a problem in and of itself, and not merely as related to morality.

This paper has been an attempt to show the possible problems that come with the rejection of doxastic voluntarism. This is not to say that is wrong, necessarily, but only to show that its consequences go far beyond a rejection of epistemic responsibility.

Works Cited

Brugger, Walter and Baker, Kenneth. Philosophical Dictionary. Spokane, WA, 1972.

Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London, 2000.

Crumley, Jack S II. An Introduction to Epistemology. Mountain View, CA, 1999.