Jon Jones

Is There Any Moral Basis to the Idea of Institutionalizing Retributivism?

Whenever there is a discussion on punishment, at some point there is either a refutation or embracing of retributivism. There are rarely neutral opinions on the topic, and overall feelings about retributivism contribute heavily to how our punishment system will be run. Interestingly enough, almost any argument for or against retributivism is moral in nature; there are almost no social or psychological reasons behind the arguments. But is there any moral basis to the idea of institutionalizing retributivism? Obviously, one group thinks there is not, while the retributivists believe that there is a moral basis for it.

There are a number of objections to the retrivutivist side. One of them is that retributivism is based on our animal, primal, uncivilized side of our minds. “Eye for an eye” is just so simple and uncivilized that it has no place in our modern, civilized world. Another objection is that criminal behavior is a disease, and that seeking vengeance on criminals is like attacking a cancer patient because his bald head his illness has caused distress in others. It just seems inherently wrong to do that. Yet another argument is that we are unable to actually give the criminal an appropriate punishment, because there just isn’t any way to make them hurt like they’ve made others hurt. Finally, there is the argument that retributivism doesn’t do anybody any good; the victim is still hurt, but now you’ve just hurt someone else. How does the help the victim, or society, or anyone at all? This argument is responsible for the phrase “an eye for an eye ‘till all the world is blind.”

However, I do not believe these reasons are valid. First, there is no reason to think that merely because our animal, uncivilized side says we should do something, we should automatically discard it in light of some other, more civilized way of doing things. My primitive side tells me I should eat and sleep, and yet I do not feel that eating or sleeping are morally wrong. Therefore, the mere fact that the primitive side says to do something does not make it morally wrong. As far as our inability to administer appropriate justice for most crimes, this is merely an argument against our system. It is not an argument about the morals of retributivism, but an argument about human fallibility. Therefore, it doesn’t really have any bearing on our moral discussion of retributivism. The last two arguments dealt with the fact that it doesn’t do anyone any good and that it is like attacking a cancer patient. The fact that it doesn’t do anyone any good should not really matter. This seems illogical, but from a moral standpoint, it is true. What is more “right”, abiding by your morals or getting money? The former seems obvious. Getting money can be replaced with any earthly gain. So we have a choice of abiding by morals or any earthly gain, which also seems obviously favoring the former. For a country, its morals are its laws. Abiding by laws or earthly gain? Finally, the fact that you value abiding by your morals/laws more than any earthly gains means that you value moral/lawful things over earthly gains. And therefore, if there is a morality to retributivism, then the fact that it produces no earthly gains is a moot point. Finally, the argument about criminal behavior as a disease assumes that all behavior is determined, which basically gets rid of the notion of free will. So in order to really accept this as an argument against retributivism, you would first have to accept that free will does not exist. But if free will does not exist, then what place would morals have in our universe anyway? Why bother having a moral discussion if we can’t even choose to act morally, which is the whole point of them?

That takes care of the arguments against, but is there anything that tells us that retributivism is moral? There are a few ways of looking at it in a moral light. First, when a criminal commits an immoral act, there must be something that balances that act out, and that is the purpose of retributivism; it must act as a balancer. Another is that the criminal, in committing a crime, deserves some punishment in the same way that someone doing something good deserves blessings. “Deserves” is a moral judgment of the act, and retributivism fulfills this punishment that is deserved, making retributivism a moral tool.

Retributivism, then, does seem to have some moral basis. Of course, this doesn’t necessarily mean governments should use it; there are other factors to consider aside from mere moral ones. However, in a world in which morals were the only reason for doing anything, retributivism would be welcome as a system of punishment.